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ABSTRACT 
Failure diagnosis in large and complex systems such as a communication network 
is a critical task. An important aspect of network management is fault management 
,i.e.,determining, locating, isolating, and correcting faults in the network. In the realm 
of discrete event systems Sampath et al proposed a failure diagnosis approach, and ~Tiang 
et al proposed an efficient algorithm for testing diagnosability. In this work, we adopt the 
framework of the communicating finite state machine (CFSM)of Miller et al for modeling 
networks and to investigate fault detection, fault identification and fault location using 
Sam~ath et al and Jiang et al methods. Our approach provides a systematic way of 
performing fault diagnosis aspects of network fault management. 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Rapid growth in telecommunication networks and the fast evolution in technology 
makes the proper operation of networks a necessity. Thus efficient network management 
approach plays a significant role. The International Standard Organization (ISO) has 
defined network management for the Open System Interconnection's (OSI) seven layer 
model in terms of five functional areas: Fault management, Configuration management, 
Accounting management, Performance management, and Security management. Fault 
management usually covers the following aspects: detection, location, identification, 
coverage, and correction. 
A considerable effort has been made to standardize network management protocols 
and develop network management systems, such as Simple Network Management Proto- 
col (SNMP) and the Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP). Much needs 
to be done to formalize ways to specify network fault management problems, and de- 
veloping formal techniques to solve them. In our work we model the network using 
finite state machine (FSM) as in [5], and also using communicating finite state machine 
(CFSM) as in [7]. We consider fault detection problem and fault diagnosis/identification. 
There are two approaches to test a network for fault management: active testing, 
and passive testing. Active testing method injects test messages in the network. The 
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response to these test messages are then checked to find network faults such as dead 
links and nodes. Active testing has techniques in common with conformance testing of 
protocols. Conformance testing is used to test protocols ofd line to insure that protocol 
conforms to its specification. Test sequences are generated from specification. These test 
sequences are then applied as input sequences to the implementation. If the produced 
output sequence doesn't match the one expected from the specification, a fault is said 
to have been observed. 
Fault management for networks takes place while it is in operation, so a test should 
not hamper its operation. Active testing increases traffic in an operating network as it 
injects test messages. Passive testing, on the other hand, doesn't inject any test message 
in the system. Passive testing is a method in which the input-output sequence of the 
network in operation is observed, i.e., it only observes the existing traffic in the network 
to determine the occurrence of a fault. It is found to be considerably useful in network 
fault detection and identification without increasing the traffic overhead. 
We use discrete event system approach to detect, and identify faults, and also to get 
some information about the fault location. We use finite state machine model to repre-
sent each node of the network. We utilize the concepts of delectability of discrete event 
system to detect the occurrence of a fault, and then use the concepts of diagnosability to 
diagnose the particular type of fault that occurs. We have presented a formal framework 
to represent, and address the problem of fault management. 
In Chapter 2 we introduce discrete event system and its model representation. We 
then discuss delectability and diagnosability in discrete event system domain in Chapter 
3. In Chapter 4 we discuss the issues involved in network fault management, and difrerent 
approaches addressing them. In Chapter 5 we discuss our approach to address network 
fault management using discrete event system, and in Chapter 6 we conclude with our 
results, and mention some possible future work. 
4 
2 DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEM 
A Discrete Event System (DES) is a dynamic system that evolves in accordance 
with the abrupt occurrence of events, at irregular intervals. For example, an event may 
correspond to the arrival, or departure of a customer in a queue, or transmission of a 
packet in a communication network, or change in the set point in a complex control 
system. DESs arise in the domain of robotics, manufacturing, vehicular trafFic logistics, 
asynchronous hardware, embedded control, and computer and communication networks. 
These applications require control and coordination to ensure some prescribed orderly 
flow of events. 
A logical model of DES models the order in which events occur and doesn't take 
timing of an event into account. In some applications where timing is crucial, a timed 
automaton model is used. 
A Logical DES Model 
E denotes finite set of events. A concatenation of events forms a string of events 
or a event trace. A language is a collection of traces. E* is the set of all finite strings 
(traces) of events of E including the empty string E. A language is thus a subset of E*•. 
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For a language H, the notation H called the prefix closure of H, is the set of all prefixes 
of traces in H. H is said to be prefix closed if H = H 
A discrete event system can be represented by a state machine or automaton con-
sisting of a four tuple, 
G = (X~ ~~ S~ xo )~ 
where 
X is the set of states, 
E is the set of events, 
S : X x (E U{E}) ~ 2X is the partial state transition function, i.e., on the occurrence 
of an event at a state it specifies the set of states the system transitions to, and 
xo E X is the initial state. 
G is said to be deterministic if S(., E) _ ~ and ~S(., ~) ~ < 1 for all ~ E E. Otherwise 
it is nondeterministic. The event behavior of the discrete event system modeled by G is 
described by its generated language: 
where by induction the transition function has been extended from events to traces 
S : X x ~* --~ 2X . The generated language of G is the set of all traces that it can execute 
starting from its initial state. 
Synchronous composition [2] [14] of state machines is used to represent the concurrent 
behavior of two interacting discrete event systems. Given two deterministic state ma-
chines G1 : _ (X 1, ~ l , S1, xo,l) and G2 : _ (X2, ~2, S2, xo,2) , composition of G1 and GZ de-
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noted Gl ~~G2 :_ (X, ~, S, xo), is defined as: X := Xl x X2, ~ :_ ~l U~2, xo :_ (xo,1 ~ xo,2) 
and for each x = (xl , x2) E X and Q E E: 
( 51(x1 ~ ~) ~ S2 (x2 ~ ~)) ~ 2~ S1(xl ~ ~) ~ ~2 (x2 ~ ~) defined , o- E ~l n ~2 
(bl (x1, ~), x2) if Sl (xl, ~) defined , ~ E ~l — ~2
(xl ~ S2 (x2 ~ ~)) Z~ S2 (x2 ~ ~) defined , O" E ~2 - ~1 
Undefined Otherwise 
On synchronous composition of G1 and G2 the common events occur synchronously, 
while the other events occur asynchronously. Note that when ~1 = ~2 = ~, then 
L (Gl ~ ~ GZ ) = L (G1) n L (G2) since all events must occur synchronously. 
Supervisory control theory initiated by Ramadge-wonham [14], provides a systematic 
approach to the design of a controller in areas such as manufacturing, communication 
protocols, circuit hardware synthesis, and automatic traffic controls. 
For supervisory control, plant (DES to be controlled) events are partitioned into two 
disjoint sets ~~, the set of all controllable events, and ~u , the set of all uncontrollable 
events. A controllable event is one which can be allowed to occur or prevented from 
occurring by an external agent, whereas no such control is possible for an uncontrollable 
event. In a control system, controllable events are events causing transitions in actuator 
signals, whereas uncontrollable ones are those which cause transitions in sensor signals. 
Based on the ability to observe the set of events is classified into ~o, the set of all 
observable events, and duo, the set of unobservable events. An observable event is one 
which can be observed to have occurred. 
~~x, ~~ :_ 
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FAILURE DIAGNOSIS DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
In literature there may be found several definitions for the term fault. The Webster 
dictionary defines the term fault as a defect in quality or constitution. Within the 
engineering community a fault is regarded as physical condition that causes a device, 
a component or, an element to fail to perform in a required manner. The Reliability, 
Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Dictionary defines the fault as an accidental 
condition that causes a previously functional unit to fail to perform its required function. 
In the same source fault is regarded as an immediate cause of a failure (often classified 
based on duration, extent, value and whether the cause was physical or humane) . In 
turn a failure is defined as an event that makes equipment deviate from specified limits of 
useful performance, or that terminates the ability of a unit's material or structure from 
performing its required function. As a result, a malfunction occurs, which is defined 
to be the inability of a system or system component to perform a required function 
within specified limits (inability to meet or conform to a specified requirement) . The 
discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition/requirement, 
and true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition/requirement is termed 
error. 
In our work, "failure" and "fault" mean the same and are used interchangeably. They 
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refer to anon-permitted deviation in the behavior of the system (or a component of the 
system) for a bounded or unbounded period of time. A stuck-close valve, decrease in the 
efficiency of a heat exchanger, abnormal bias in the output of a sensor, and leakage in 
pipelines are examples of failure. If after the occurrence of a failure, the system remains 
in the faulty condition indefinitely, then the failure is called permanent. Otherwise, it 
is non-permanent or transient. A broken shaft in a motor is an example of permanent 
failure, and a loose wire could be the source of a transient failure in an electrical system. 
A typical fault diagnosis system uses the outputs of the sensors of the system to 
detect the failure and (if necessary) isolate (locate) the source of failure. Once a failure 
is detected, a decision has to be made as to how it should be recovered from. It is 
necessary to detect and further isolate the source of failure to be able to perform failure 
recovery effectively. So, a failure recovery problem involves afailure-diagnosis problem. 
A wide variety of schemes have been proposed for failure diagnosis, some of which 
are discussed next . 
Related Prior Research 
Partial observation problems in DES's have been investigated by several researchers. 
The notions related to diagnosability like observability, observability with delay, and 
invertibility have been the subject of several papers. In this section, we first discuss other 
approaches to diagnosability that have been proposed in DES literature. Afterward, we 
discuss briefly the differences between diagnosability and the other notions. 
There are three major factors that motivate research on failure diagnosis: 
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1. failures are inevitable; 
2. failure diagnosis is important (if not crucial); and 
3. failure diagnosis is difficult. 
Failures are inevitable in today's complex industrial environment. Given the complex 
interactions between components, sub-systems, and processes, a system failure can well 
be considered to be a "normal" occurrence [24], or an inherent characteristic of most 
industrial systems. 
If a failure is detected late, it might "spread" , and cause unnecessary operational 
disturbances, and even material and personal damage. Timely and accurate detection 
of these failures may prevent the cascaded effect that simple failures produce, resulting 
in system-wide breakdowns and major accidents. 
Also, a failure may well be easy to fix, but hard to find. A skilled operator can 
often quickly isolate the failure in systems (s) he is familiar with, but as systems grow 
more complex, this manual diagnosis becomes more difficult, and specialists capable 
of performing it are more expensive to train. It is therefore of interest to have, if not 
totally automated, sophisticated diagnosis tool for complex systems. In view of the above 
mentioned factors, one can easily appreciate automated mechanisms for the timely and 
accurate diagnosis of failures. Indeed, this need is well understood and appreciated both 
in industry and in academia. A great deal of research effort has been and is being spent in 
the design and development of automated diagnostic systems; and a variety of schemes, 
differing both in their theoretical framework and in their design and implementation 
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philosophy, have been proposed. 
A traditional approach to diagnosis used in many industrial systems is simple limit 
checking of signal values and predefined threshold logic. For example, if a sensor value 
leaves its normal range, an alarm is generated. Due to cascaded effect of failure prop-
agation in the system, often a number of alarms are set off and then the problem is 
to isolate the root cause. Common methods used are fault trees and expert systems, 
although these methods are not restricted only to alarm analysis. 
Non-Model Based Approaches 
In this section we briefly describe some approaches with the common feature that 
they explicitly associate an observed misbehavior with a 1~nown failure. The kind of 
pattern-matching methods these approaches use are often called associative. 
Fault Trees 
Fault tree analysis is a widely used technique in the process control industry for 
reliability analysis, fault detection and isolation. The basic idea is that a failure can 
trigger other failures or events in the system and this can be tracked back to the root 
cause [25] [26] . A fault tree graphically represents acause-effect relationship in the sys-
tem. The root of a fault tree, the so called TOP event, is a system failure. A fault tree 
with leaves as the possibly contributing atomic events or basic faults, and inner nodes of 
AND- and OR- type, is then constructed, often manually from the system specification. 
Sets of events that trigger the top event are computed using cut sets and minimal cut 
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sets. By assigning probabilities to the atomic events, a failure probability can be found. 
Manual fault tree construction is laborious and error prone, and much work has 
been done on computer assisted and automatic fault tree construction, see for instance 
[27] [28] [29] . 
Expert Systems 
A popular method for diagnosis and supervision of complex systems has been the 
use of expert systems, often in conjunction with fault tree structures, see, e.g., [30] [31] . 
Expert systems are especially well suited for systems that are difficult to model, with 
complex interactions between and within components. Domain experts have heuristic 
knowledge of the system and of how symptoms relate to faults. In traditional expert 
systems, this knowledge is represented in a rule based and used in conjunction with an 
inference engine. 
This heuristic approach has several drawbacks. Acquiring knowledge from experts is 
difficult and time consuming, and for new systems a considerable amount of time might 
elapse before enough knowledge has accumulated to make reliable diagnosis possible. 
The rule base is very domain dependent and not reusable, and the maintenance of large 
rule bases is difficult. 
Chronicles 
An expert system-like approach to diagnosis of dynamic systems using temporal in-
formation, is the real-time situation recognition method described in [32][33]. For system 
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under consideration, a set of events, obtainable for instance by signal processing, is de-
fined. A number of situations that are considered desirable to recognize are characterized 
with these events and temporal constraints among the events. Such a characterization 
of a situation is called a chronicle and can correspond both to correct operation and fail-
ures of the system. A situation recognizer is then fed with observed and time-stamped 
events in real-time and can notify an operator for example when a failure situation has 
occurred or is under development. Of course only known situation can be recognized. 
See also the concluding comments on expert systems above. 
Fuzzy Logic Based Approach 
Tsukamoto and Terano used a set of fuzzy relational inequalities in order to describe 
the intensity of the causal deterministic relationships existing between faults (as causes) 
and the determined symptoms (as efFects) . Since then this idea has been successfully 
applied for diagnosis of complex industrial processes, based on subjectively observed 
symptoms, see [50] [51]. Sanchez has built up a "symptoms-faults" fuzzy relational map-
ping by directely encoding expert medical diagnostic knowledge . As a result, A fuzzy 
rule based fault detection and diagnosis system can be developed by combining fuzzy 
linguistic rules with non-fuzzy numerical data . The design of the fuzzy reference set, 
inference mechanism, and signal coding and decoding policies are dependent on the 
problem background. 
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Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian network has been referred to by different names in the literature: Bayes be- 
lief net [52], causal probabilistic network [53], causal networks [54], probabilistic causal 
networks [55] influence diagrams. It is, at the qualitative level, a graph where the nodes 
represent domain objects and the arcs between nodes represent causal relationships be- 
tween objects, which is then modeled at a quantitative level by conditional probabilities, 
and processed via the Bayes-Laplace formula. Bayesian network can be used to study 
the diagnosis problem. It computes the probabilistic evidence of the unobserved part 
of the domain given that a part of the domain (the symptoms variables) has known or 
assumed values (in form of probability distributions). 
This approach has its own drawbacks. The priori necessary probabilistic information 
is not always available and event independence does not always hold. Computation 
complexity is almost intractable . 
Neural Network 
A neural network being applied for fault detection and diagnosis is developed through 
`learning', i.e. `learning from examples', even if one does not know the `if--then' kind of 
linguistic rules or process principle in detail [56] . The design of neural network architec-
tures and learning algorithms depends on the forms of learning examples. Neverthless, 
whichever method is applied, the key task is to establish a neural network with an 
associative memory which can classify the input space into a number of fault related 
domains. The learning algorithms designed mainly depend on the informative form 
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and content in the training samples; generally, `BP-learning', `reinforcement learning' or 
`self-organized learning' can be used. However, the fault diagnosis or decision making 
for control actions is a more complicated problem, particularly for a high dimensional, 
nonlinear, and uncertain system. 
Model Based Approaches 
The basic idea of all model based diagnosis is to compare observations of the real 
system with the predictions from a model. In the case of a fault, a discrepancy between 
the actual observed behavior and the predicted behavior arise. This discrepancy can 
then be used to detect, isolate and identify the fault depending on the type of model 
and methods used. The kinds of models used by these approaches are often called 
explanatory. Several approaches to model based diagnosis with model paradigms ranging 
from differential equations to qualitative behavior models have appeared in the literature 
and proven useful in practice. 
Analytical Redundancy 
In the control system community, the most common class of model based diagnosis 
method proposed is the analytical redundancy method, see for instance [34] [35] [37] 
[38], and references therein. These methods are based on the fact that observed signals 
from the system, such as sensor measurement and control signals, contain information 
regarding the system state. The desired state information can be extracted with the 
help of a good differential equation model of the system, often obtained by physical 
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modeling, or system identification [39]. 
In general, these methods consist of two steps. First, residuals are generated by 
comparing observed signals from the system with predicted values. These residuals 
are usually designed to be zero if no fault is present. Second, a fault detection and 
isolation step is employed, using these residuals as input. One of the main problems 
with this approach is the difficulty in acquiring good enough models. The demands 
on the accuracy of the models are usually higher than for control design, since the 
residual generator works open-loop. Robust methods for residual generation has received 
considerable attention in recent years and is an active research area, see, e.g., [35] [40J . 
Recently, there have also been some efforts towards formally demonstrating the con-
nections between the analytical redundancy methods and the model-based approaches 
in AI briefly described in [37]. 
Approaches in AI 
In artificial intelligence, model-based diagnosis from first principles, is pioneered by 
Reiter [41]. The basic idea is to predict the behavior of the system using behavioral and 
structural models of the system and its components and compare it with observations 
of the actual behavior of the real system. Two main characterizations of model based 
diagnosis exists in the literature, consistency based diagnosis [41] and abductive diagnosis 
[42]. The former needs a model of the correct behavior only, and a diagnosis is a set 
of components that when assumed non-correct, makes the predicted behavior consistent 
with the observed. The abductive approach must have models of the faulty behavior. A 
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diagnosis is a set of component faults that is not only consistent with, but also explicitly 
predicts the observed behavior. A good introduction to model-based diagnosis is the 
Chapter 2 of [43], and for a comprehensive collection of literature, see [44]. 
Model based diagnosis in AI is mainly aimed at static systems and especially at 
troubleshooting combinatorial digital circuits. The extension of the methodology to 
dynamic and time-varying systems remains an active research area, see., [43] [45] [46] [47]. 
Template 
A method for fault monitoring of automated manufacturing systems using the timing 
and sequencing of events has recently been developed by Holloway et al. [48] [49]. So 
called time templates or condition templates are used to specify the expected, correct 
timing and sequencing of events. Templates are designed to be easily implemented on 
distributed architectures and are used to detect deviations from the correct behavior. 
Specific faults can not be diagnosed. The method is capable of monitoring event se- 
quences corresponding to an arbitrary number of concurrent timed automata, and a 
timed automata specification can be automatically translated to templates [49]. The 
manual construction of templates is not feasible when timed automata model is not 
known, and work has been done on identifying templates from observations of sequences 
of events. 
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A state Based DES Approach 
A discrete event system approach for diagnosis is proposed by Lin [15] and further 
treated in [16]. The system is modeled as a finite state machine, where the states of 
the machine describe conditions of the components. The only dynamics in the FSM is 
that the system can transit from normal to faulty, and no normal behavior is modeled. 
The observations (sensor readings) are included as a mapping from the fault states to 
certain observable events (tests). Diagnosing a fault is equivelant to identifying which 
state or set of states the system belongs to. Off- line and on-line diagnosis are treated 
separately. 
In ofF line diagnosis the system is thought to be in a test-bed, where the system does 
not change stage unless it is forced to while under diagnosis. Test can be performed, 
and the outcome of the tests are called observable events. The off-line diagnosability of 
the system is analyzed with respect to a fault partition and the set of observable events 
(i.e., tests). Since the system is in a test-bed, the order in which the tests are performed 
does not affect the diagnosability. 
In on-line diagnosis, the system is in normal operation, and hence it can change state 
uncontrollably. The system is assumed to be partially observable via an output map. 
Given a state (fault) partition, the system is defined to be on- line diagnosable if there 
exists sequence of commands so that the state of the system, up to the fault partition, 
can be decided from the output map. An algorithm for computing such a sequence is 
given in [15]. 
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Formal Language 
Sampath et al. has proposed a formal language framework for studying diagnosabil-
ity properties of un-timed discrete event systems [11) . The approach is closely related to 
the Ramage-Wonham framework for supervisory control of DES. The method has been 
applied to HVAC- systems (heating, ventilation and air-condition) , but is applicable to 
all systems that at some level can be meaningfully modeled as discrete event systems. 
The main features of the approach is methods for modeling the normal and faulty be-
havior of systems as DES, implementation of online passive diagnosis, and analysis of 
diagnosability properties. 
Both the normal and faulty behavior of the system to be diagnosed is modeled 
with a finite state machine. Components are modeled individually and faults in the 
components are modeled as unobservable events. The system model is then put together 
with the usual synchronous composition. To include sensor information in the model, 
global sensor maps from the states of the model to sensor readings are constructed and 
then included in the event labels. The diagnostic problem is then to infer about past 
occurrences of unobservable fault events from the observable events. A diagnoser that 
gives a state and fault estimation of the system after occurrence of each observable event 
is constructed from the model. The diagnoser hence is an extended observer. 
One of the main features of this approach is the ability to analyze diagnosability 
properties. Diagnosability is, the ability to detect and isolate an occurred fault Wlth 
finite delay using the observable events. Isolation is performed with respect to a fault 
partition. 
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To demand that a fault should always be diagnosed with finite delay is rather strong, 
and very few systems can fulfill it. Therefore the notion of I-diagnosability is introduced, 
which means that a fault should be detected and, up to a given partition, isolated with 
finite delay after a so called indicator event has occurred. Stated in other words, the 
system has to be excited enough for the fault to be diagnosed. 
If a model of a system is not diagnosable (I-diagnosable), the authors identify two 
means of making it diagnosable: i) introduce more sensors and ii) design the controller 
so that the faulty behavior is excited and can be detected. The theory is set in a 
formal language framework. In [11] and [57], the authors present a method for designing 
controllers in the RW-framework that make the system diagnosable. Chen and Provan 
has extended the approach to timed discrete event systems [58]. 
This concludes our discussion on approaches to failure diagnosis that have appeared 
in the literature. Each of the above methods possesses certain advantages and disadvan- 
tages, and is best applicable under specific circumstances. Which of these approaches 
one selects for a given system depends not only on the characteristics of the system and 
the knowledge available about the system but also on the nature of the failures one wants 
to diagnose. With this background on the importance of the failure diagnosis problem 
and the various methodologies to solve this problem, we now proceed on to discussion 
related to our proposed research. 
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Discrete Event System Approach 
Discrete event system approach for failure diagnosis is a systematic, method for 
timely and accurate diagnosis of system failures. The states in the discrete event system 
model reflect the normal and the abnormal states of the system components. The failure 
events form part of the event set. The challenge is to detect the occurrence of such events. 
The system behavior is modeled as a regular language, and is represented by a finite 
state machine. An occurrence of a faulty event can be diagnosed by observing the 
trace the system executes. Diagnosability is the ability to detect the past occurrence 
of unobservable failure events from unbounded number of observed events. In discrete 
event system the following representation is used. 
Let Eo C E denote set of observable events Euo = E — Eo be the set of unobservable 
events, 
M : E —> EoU {e} be the observation mask, 
F = {Fi, i = 1, 2, 3 m} are the set of failure types 
~ : E --~ F ~J {~1} is the failure assignment function for each event in E. 
The diagnosability for discrete event systems is defined in [l1] [12] as follows: 
Definition 1: A prefix closed language L is said to be diagnosable with respect to 
the observation mask M and the failure assignment function ~ if the following holds: 
(b'Fi E F) (~n2 E N) (`ds E L, ~(s f ) = Fi) (dv = st E L, (~ ~t~ ~ > nz or stE* n L = {st}), 
~ (`dw E L, M(w) = M(v)) (~ u E pr({w}), ~(u f ) _ {Fi}) 
where s f  and u f  denote the last events in traces s and u respectively, pr({w}) is the 
set of all prefixes of w. A system G is said to be diagnosable if its language L(G) is 
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diagnosable. 
The above definition means that if s is a trace in L ending with a FZ-type failure, 
then along every sufficiently long continuation or deadlocking t of s one can detect the 
occurrence of a failure of the type of FZ . Alternatively, diagnosability requires that 
every failure event leads to observations distinct enough to enable unique identification 
of failure type within a finite delay. 
Algorithm for Testing Diagnosability 
We now present the algorithm for testing the diagnosability as given by Jiang et al[l). 
For asystem G = (X, E, S, xo) with an observation mask M and a failure assignment 
function ~, do the following: 
1. Obtain a nondeterministic finite state machine Go = (Xo, ~o, So, xo) with language 
L(Go) = M(L(G)) as follows: 
• ~o, the set of observable events, is the set of event labels for Go. 
• So C Xo x ~o x Xo is the set of transitions. ((x, f ), ~, (x', f')) E So if and 
only if there exists a path (x, ~1 ~ xl ~ • • • ~ ~n ~ xn ~ ~~ x' ) (n > 0) in G such that 
= e, il1(o) = a, and f' _ {yi(a,) ~ ry/ (a,) ¢ 0, 1 
2<n}u f. 
• xo = (xo, ~) E Xo is the initial state. 
2. Compute Gd = (Go ~~Go), the strict composition of Go with itself. Then 
d1 
Gd = (X d, ~o, Sd ~ x o l , where 
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• Xd = { (xl , x2) ( x1, x2 E X o} is the set of states. 
• ~o is the set of event labels for Gd. 
• Sd C Xd x ~o x Xd is the set of transitions. ((xi, x2), ~, (~J1, ~JZ)) E Sd if and 
only if both (xl, ~, ~1) and (x2, ~, y2) are in So. 
• xo = (xo, xo) E Xd is the initial state. 
3. Check whether there exists in Gd a cycle cl = (xl , ~-1, x2~ • • • ~ xn~ ~n~ xl) ~ n >_ 1  ~ 
xi = ((xi , f 1), (xi , fi )), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, such that fi ~ fi . If the answer is 
yes, then output that the system is not diagnosable; otherwise output that the 
system is diagnosable. This last step can be performed by first identifying states 
((xl , f l) , (x2, f2)) in Gd for which f 1 ~ f 2, and deleting all the other states and 
the associated transitions; and next checking if the remainder graph contains a 
cycle. 
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4 FAULT MANAGEMENT IN NETWORK 
Communication network is a large complicated system. The wide variety of ap-
plications executed on the network makes fault management a critical task. Fault in 
networks [23] is normally associated with failure of a network component leading to loss 
of connectivity or performance. Fault management in networks is a five-step process in-
volving, fault detection, fault identification, fault location, fault resolution, and service 
restoration. 
Diagnosis of a fault in a network can be done by sending test signals, and receiving 
response. If there is no fault the response would be the expected one or else a fault is de-
tected. When a centralized network management system receives a trap or notification, 
it is called receiving an event. A single problem source might lead to multiple symp-
toms, each symptom is reported as an independent event to the management system. 
This cascading of events results in confusion. The management system, thus, needs to 
correlate the events, and isolate the root cause. The methods used to do so are called 
event correlation techniques. 
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Event Correlation Approaches 
Several correlation methods are used to isolate and localize faults in networks. These 
are based on, 
1. Detecting and filtering of events, 
2. Correlating observed events to isolate and localize faults either topologically or 
functionally, and 
3. Identifying the cause of the problem. 
Difi'erent correlation approaches can be categorized as: 
• Rule based reasoning 
• Model based reasoning 
• Case based reasoning 
• Code book 
• State transition model 
• Finite state machine model 
Rule based reasoning contains a working memory, a knowledge base, and an infer-
ence engine. Three levels representing these three components are data level, knowledge 
level, and control level. The knowledge level contains expert knowledge of problems and 
actions. The knowledge base is a rule-base in the form if-then, condition-action. The 
working memory has information about the state and topology of the network being 
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monitored. The working memory knows when the network is in faulty state. The in-
ference engine matches the left side of the rule-base, and based on the closest match, 
obtains output as the right side of the rule. 
In model based reasoning an event correlator is built on an object-oriented model 
associated with each managed object. To represent the components, the object oriented 
model has attributes, relations to other models, and behaviors. 
Case based reasoning is modeled on the intuition that situations repeat themselves 
in real world. Thus to resolve a trouble, previous experience is taken into consideration. 
The general CBR architecture contains modules: input, retrieve, adapt, and process, 
along with a case library. Current trouble is resolved by adapting some previous one in 
one of the three ways: parameterized adaptation (similar case with different parameter 
values) , abstraction/respecialization adaptation (to adapt to a situation) , and critic 
based adaptation (a person or critic decides on what to do) . 
Code book correlation model contains a configuration model, which contains 
networks configuration. It also contains an event model having various events and their 
causal relationships. The correlator correlates the alarm events with the event model 
and determines the problems that caused the alarm events. 
State transition graph model dynamically changes states. It sends a test signal 
and changes state to receive mode, and again transitions to send mode once it receives 
a response. 
Finite state machine model is a model based fault detection scheme using com-
municating finite state machine. The main feature of this process is that it is a passive 
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testing system based on the assumption that an observer agent is present in each node 
and reports abnormalities to a central point. This is the method we have adopted for 
fault management in networks. 
Passive Testing Approach 
Passive testing and its application to network fault management was introduced in 
the paper by Lee [5]. Lee's [5] approach was further refined by Miller et al. [7], who 
modeled each network node as a deterministic finite state machine (DFSM), G, is a 
six-tuple, G = (I, O, X, xo, S, ~), where: 
I, O and X are finite non-empty sets of input symbols, output symbols, and states 
respectively, xo is a designated initial state, b : X x I —~X is the state transition function, 
and ~ : X x I —~O is the output function. 
When the machine is in state x E X and receives an input Z in I , it moves to the 
next state b (x, i) and produces the output ~ (x, i) . 
The transition function b and output function ~ can be extended from symbols 
to traces as: For an initial state so , and an input sequence i1, • • • , i~, the machine 
successively transitions to states x~+1 = b(s~, z~), j = 1, • • • , I~, and produces an output 
sequence of , • . . , o~, where o~ _ ~ (x~ , 2~) , j = 1, . . . ,1~. 
As an input/output sequence of the implementation machine B is observed it is 
compared with the specification FSM A. B is considered faulty if its behavior is dif- 
ferent than that of A. That is, there is no trace in A that will account the observed 
input/output sequence. The procedure for detecting this is to first start with the set X 
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consisting of all potential initial states of A. Then, with the first observed input/output 
it /ol a new set of states Xl, the successor states of A from states in X, is computed. 
This process is continued for each i~/off to produce an X~ set from X~_1. If at some 
point X~ becomes a singleton set then the sequence up to this point is called a passive 
homing sequence. If at some point l~, X,~ becomes empty, we know that B is faulty 
since no state A could be reached on this observed input/output sequence. The detailed 
algorithm that describes the above procedure is given in [5]. 
The problem for this approach is that it does not identify the property the system 
must satisfy so that following the occurrence of any fault converges to the empty set. 
In order to identify the fault that may have occured, Miller [7] gave aforward/backward 
crossover algorithm. It can be summarized as follows: 
• Conduct the forward trace analysis for the observed input/output sequence, and 
let k be the least 1~ such that X~ = 0. 
• Conduct the backward analysis for the observed input/output sequence. Note that 
this can only be done after the complete input/output sequence has occurred. 
• Add crossover arrows by adding possible output fault and transition faults [7~. 
Our diagnoser based approach does not require any backward analysis, making it 
simpler. Plus, it can be easily generalized to case with multiple observers. (see Chapter 
5) 
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5 DISCRETE EVENT APPROACH TO NETWORK FAULT 
MANAGEMENT 
In this Chapter, we describe our approach to network fault management. We discuss 
its efFectiveness as compared to the results shown in [7] for identification of network 
faults. We first briefly give an introduction of the framework used. 
As in [7] [1] we make the following assumptions for the system under investigation: 
• We consider three types of faults, transition fault, output fault, and input fault. 
• We assume that only one fault exists at a given time. 
The System Model 
A discrete event system is a dynamic system which evolves in accordance with the 
abrupt occurrence of events, which can be modeled by a finite state machine. A network 
used for communication, is such a dynamic system, in which events occur at each node, at 
unknown irregular intervals of time. So, in our approach for network fault management, 
we view a network to be a discrete event system, and model each node in the network 
as a deterministic finite state machine [5] [7] or automaton: 
G = (X ~ ~ ~ b~ xo) 
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where X is the state space, ~ is the set of events, S : X x ~ --~ 2X is the partial state 
transition function, i.e., on the occurrence of an event in the event set ~ the system 
transitions from a state in the set of states X to another state in the same set X, and 
xo is the initial state. 
The normal behavior of the system is modeled by Go, and the faulty behavior of the 
system is modeled by {GZ ~i > 0}, where i represents a system with ith kind of fault. 
The state behavior of the system is given by the state-transition (sequence of states) it 
can visit, whereas event behavior is given by the event traces it can execute. For a state 
trace II, we use tr (II) to denote the associated event traces. Note that two state-traces 
II1, and II2 with the same event trace tr (II1) = tr (II2) are considered indistinguishable. 
Henceforth, we represent the state behavior of GZ by LZ, and event behavior by L(GZ) 
then L UZ>o LZ is the set of all state traces, and Ui>o L(Gi) is the set of all event traces 
that can be executed by a given system. 
Note that each GZ contains at most one fault, reflecting the underlying assumption 
that at most one fault can exist at any given time. 
We now consider the example of protocol X.25 taken from [7] to show the models of 
difrerent systems {GZ ~i > 0} under the representation method we have discussed. 
30 
Example 1 The protocol X.25 shown in Figure 5.1 has four states S1, S2, S3, and a 
"dump state" D. 
• 
Dump State , D 
Go
Figure 5.1 Normal behavior of the system 
The system transitions from one state to the other on an observed input-output pair. 
The notations given on the edges of the state transition graph represent the input-output 
pair for a transition. For example, Y/R is an input-output pair, where Y is the input and 
R is the output, at state S1 causing the transition to S2. The meaning of the notations 
for the inputs, and outputs pair: 
Y:Ready(initialized), R:Call Request, C:Call Accept, D:Data, A:Acknowledge, and 
L:Clear(terminate the call). 
A transition to the dump state occurs due to an input fault, and the system stops 
execution. An input fault occurs when a state receives an unexpected input. For exam-
ple, when S1 receives C as input, an input fault occurs (Figure 5.2) and it goes to the 
state D. 
We consider two other kinds of faults the transition fault, and the output fault. A 
transition fault occurs when a state transitions to an unexpected state on an expected 
input-output pair. For example, Sl transitions to S3 or remains at Sl (Figure 5.3) on 
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input-output pair Y/R due to a transition fault. An output fault occurs when a state 
transitions to the expected state but gives an erroneous output. For example in Figure 
5.5 we see that Sl transitions to S2 (the expected state) but gives a wrong output due 
to an output fault. When either a transition or an output fault occurs, the system 
continues functioning. 
Go models the normal behavior of the system and GZ>o models the ithfaulty behavior 
of the system. G1iG2,G3 model the various input faults (Figure 5.2), G4,G5,G6,G7,Gg,G9
model the various transition faults (Figure 5.3 and 5.4), and G1o,G11,G12 model the 
various output faults (Figure 5.5), respectively. 
A/L A/L or C/D 
Gl :Input fault at state S 1
s2
A/I. 
or S3
Y/R 
Y/R 
s 
G3: Input fault at state S2
Black arrow head ( ► ). Normal behavior 
White arrow head (—~ ): Faulty behavior 
Figure 5.2 Models with input fault 
C/D 
G2: Input fault at state S~ 
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c~ 
D~ D 
G4: Transition fault at State S Ito S i
s2
C/D 
D~ 
s 1 
aD 
G S:Transition fault at State S2 to S2 G 6: Transition fault at State S Ito S3
Arrows with dark head ( ► ). Normal transition 
Arrows with White head (~ ): Faulty transition 
Figure 5.3 Models with transition fault 
G~: Transition fault at state S l to S 3 
Y/R 
/D 
D 
A/L C/D 
D 
S 3 
G $:Transition fault at state S ~o S 1 G 9:Transition fault at state Sato S 2
Arrows with dark head ( —~ ). Normal transition 
Arrows with White head ( ~): Faulty transition 
Figure 5.4 Models with transition fault 
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S3 
D 
Cho: Output fault at state S ~ 
Y/R 
C/R 
or 
C/L A/L 
D 
GI I :Output fault at state S 2
Arrow with black head (~ 
Arrow with white head 
s 
C/D 
2 
Y/R 
A/R 
or 
A/D 
D 
G12:Output fault at state S 3 
► ). Normal transition 
 ~ ): Faulty transition 
Figure 5.5 Models with output fault 
A model for the overall system with normal, and faulty behavior can be obtained by 
considering a new initial state SNew • From SNew state, we add transitions on epsilon 
event to all the initial states of all the systems Gi, i > 0. This gives the non-deterministic 
finite state machine of the system with and without faults. It is non-deterministic, as on 
epsilon event the system can transition to a state belonging to any of the twelve systems. 
This is shown below in Figure 5.6. 
Using one fact that at most one fault can exist at any given time, we can give a more 
compact and more intuitive model of the overall system as follows. The observation of an 
input-output pair reflects the occurrence of an event. We consider, all the input-output 
pairs in ~ as observable but a failure event cannot be distinguished from a normal one 
by observation. Thus, a failure event is unobservable. 
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G~ 
epsilon event 
G 1 G2
G3
G4
GS
S New G6 
G 12 G 11 Glo 
"7 
Gg
G 9
 J 
Figure 5.6 NDFSM G for the total system 
Fault states Fault type Fault Label 
No fault N 
Faults 
in State 
Sl
Transition fault at Sl on sequence Y/R Fl
'I~ansition fault at Sl on sequence Y/R F2
Input fault at Sl on sequence C/D F3
Input fault at Sl on sequence A/L F4
Output fault at Sl Y/D or Y/L F5
Faults 
in State 
S2
Transition fault at S2 on sequence C/D Fs
Transition fault at S2 on sequence C/D F7
Input fault at S2 on sequence Y/R F8
Input fault at SZ on sequence A/L F9
Output fault at S2 C/L or C/R Fio 
Faults 
in State 
S3
Transition fault at S3 on sequence A/L Fll 
Transition fault at S3 on sequence A/L F12 
Input fault at S3 on sequence Y/R F13 
Input fault at S3 on sequence C/D F14
Output fault at S3 A/D or A/R Fi5 
Table 5.1 Table of faults 
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To build the non-deterministic finite state machine of the overall system, we use the 
steps mentioned below: 
Algorithm 1 1. Since initially there is no fault, initial state Sl is augmented by the 
Iabel N. 
2. Next from the initial state (Sl , N), consider all the possible input-output pairs 
that can be observed. For our example, the input-output pairs can be one among 
Y/R or C/D or A/L. When the input-output pair is Y/R, the system transitions to 
either (S2, N) indicating a normal behavior, or to (Sl , Fl) indicating the transition 
fault Fi , or to (S3i F2) indicating the transition fault F2. If we observe Y/D or Y/L 
(unexpected output on expected input) we know an output fault has occurred, and 
the system transitions to (S2i F5). On A/L the system transitions to state (D, F 4) 
indicating input fault on A/L. States newly added are recursively considered for 
further state transitions in a similar fashion. 
3. If a state has a label Fi, i > 0, then since only one fault can exist at a given 
time, the ensuing transitions are non-faulty. Considering (Sl, Fl), it executes Y/R 
and transitions to (S2, Fl), where it executes C/D and transitions to (S3, Fl ), and 
finally executes A/L and transitions back to (Sl, Fl). 
Figure 5.7 shows the NDFSM built using the algorithm discussed. 
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Y/R 
1 C/D 
S2 , F~ J
A/ 
S3 , F~ J
Figure 5.7 NDFSM G of overall behavior 
Detectability 
A/L 
Our objective is to detect the occurrence of a fault, and determine the type of fault 
that has occurred, based on the input- output pair we observe. Such a method is known 
as a passive testing method. In contrast to active testing, it doesn't overload the system 
as no trafliic is injected in the network to test the occurrence of a fault. Having introduced 
the method to model the overall system, we now discuss our method for fault detection. 
Detectability means the ability to detect the occurrence of an event. When a system 
fails to execute its normal behavior, methods of failure diagnosis in discrete event system 
can be used to detect the faulty event. 
Recall that the normal state behavior is Lo , and the ith faulty one is LZ , and L = 
U oL2 models all the possible behaviors. 
A language is said to be detectable if the occurrence of a fault can be detected 
within a finite delay using a record of observed input-output pairs. Formal definition of 
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detectability is given below. 
Definition 1 Given a set of all normal state behaviors Lo, a set of all state behaviors 
L, the system is said to be detectable, if the following holds: 
(fin E N) (b'II E L — Lo) (`dIIl = IIII2 E L, ~ ~II2 I I > n or IIl deadlocks) ~ 
(b'II3 E L, tr(II1) = tr(II3))(II3 E L — Lo ) 
The meaning of the definition is that if II is a faulty trace in L — Lo, and II1 is either 
a sufficiently long extension, or a deadlocking trace, then every trace II3 in L that has 
the same trace as II1, i.e., tr(II3) = tr(IIl), should be a faulty trace. A system G is said 
to be detectable if the pair (Lo, L) is detectable. 
This definition of detectability states, that if a faulty path is executed, then extending 
it will aid in detecting the occurrence of the fault within a finite delay. We apply Jiang 
etal [1] algorithm of diagnosability to determine detestability. 
Example 2 Considering the X.25 protocol, we discuss the algorithm for detestability. 
Since, we are concerned about the detection of a fault and not it's fault type, we modify 
the non-deterministic finite state machine we obtained earlier, by replacing each Fi label 
with label F. The steps are: 
Algorithm 2 
by F. 
1. Build the NDFSM GD, for detectability by replacing each FZ label 
2. Perform the synchronous composition of GD with itself, i.e., GD ~~ GD • 
3. Check for ambiguous cycles or ambiguous deadlock states. (A state in GD is 
ambiguous if the two coordinates carry different fault labels) 
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A/L 
Figure 5.8 NDFSM GD for delectability 
A/L A/L 
F, D F S3 F, D F 
A/D or A/L 
A/L 
Figure 5.9 GD ~ ~ GD
From the synchronous composition of GD (Figure 5.9) with itself we find that there 
are no ambiguous cycles or deadlocks. So, the system is detectable. 
If a system is such that it is undetectable we can find the detectable part as follows: 
Algorithm 3 1. In GD (~ GD, identify the traces leading to ambiguous cycles or am-
biguous deadlocks situation. Each trace in GD ~ ~ GD is a pair of indistinguishable 
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trace of GD . 
2. Pick one of the indistinguishable traces, and remove it from GD . 
Thus, we get asub-part of the whole system which is detectable. 
Diagnosability 
Using the detectability algorithm we can determine which faulty traces are detectable, 
and which are not. Once we detect the occurrence of a fault (for a detectable trace), 
we would like to identify the particular kind of fault that occurred. Identification of a 
particular kind of fault is known as the diagnosis. This section on diagnosability deals 
with diagnosis of a particular type of fault. 
A system L is diagnosable for fault i if it is possible to identify within finite delay 
occurrences of failures of type i using the past observation of events. The definition of 
diagnosability is as follows: 
Definition 2 A system with state behavior L, and fault i behavior Li is said to diag- 
nosable for fault i, if the following hold: 
(~n2 E N)(dII E L)(b'II1 = IIII2 E L, ~~ II2 ~~> ni or II1 deadlocks) ~ 
(`dII3 E L, tr(II3) = tr(II1))(IIs E LZ) 
This definition of fault diagnosability states that if II is a trace in L with a failure of 
type F Z, and II1 is either a deadlocking or a sufficiently long extension of II, then every 
trace II3 in L that has the same trace as II1, i.e., tr(II3) = tr(II1), should contain in it 
a type i failure. 
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To check for diagnosability of fault i we apply the algorithm by Jiang et al[1]. 
Algorithm 4 •Construct the non-deterministic finite state machine GFi by replac- 
ing all the fault labels F~ (j ~ i) by N (This is because when we are diagnosing 
for fault i, fault j can be treated as normal). 
• Construct the synchronous composition of the non-deterministic finite state ma-
chine GFi with itself, i.e., GFz GFi 
• Check for ambiguous cycles, and ambiguous deadlock states in GFi ~~ GFi. Sys-
tem is diagnosable for fault i if and only if no ambiguous cycles and ambiguous 
deadlocks exist. 
Example 3 Considering the X.25 protocol we discuss the algorithm given for diagnos-
ability to diagnose each kind of fault in the system Gi for i > 0. First, we consider 
the diagnosis of input faults, then that of transition faults, and finally the diagnosis of 
output faults. 
NDFSM GFz for diagnosability of fault is shown in Figures 5.10-5.41. Notice only two 
types of label N, and Fi are needed for diagnosability of input fault Fi. This simplifies 
the state machine model. 
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Figure 5.10 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F8 indicated. In 
figure 5.11 the states (S3N, S2N), (S2 N, S3N), (S1NS3N), and (S3NS1N) have simi- 
lar transitions as is shown for (S1 N, S2N), and (S2N, S1N). In Figure 5.11 there are 
ambiguous deadlock states (DF4i DN), and (DN, DF4). Thus, shows that fault F4 is 
not-diagnosable. To find the diagnosable part we remove all the transitions on A/L, 
excepting the one, which leads to the input fault F4. The resulting NDFSM, GF4 is 
shown in figure 5.12. 
C/D 
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
Figure 5.10 NDFSM GF4
Figure 5.11 GF4 ~ ~ GF, 
42 
Figure 5.13 considers GF4 and shoals that there are no ambiguous deadlock states 
and no ambiguous _states in cycle (as expected) . So, vc~e can conclude that GF4 is fault 
F4 diagnosable. 
C/D 
l 
C/D 
Y/R 
1 
4 ,DF4
 J A/L 
or 
A/D 
or 
A/R 
Figure 5.12 NDFSM GF4
C/D 
C/D 
C/L 
or 
C/D 
or 
C/R 
. , 4 II ' 4 
Figure 5.13 GF GF
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
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Figure 5.14 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F3 indicated. In 
Figure 5.15 there are ambiguous deadlock states such as (DF3i DN), implying input 
fault F3 is not diagnosable. Removing transitions on C/D, excepting the one to fault F3
makes the system fault F3 diagnosable. 
C/D 
~ 1 
D , F3
~ J 
Figure 5.14 NDFSM GF3
Figure 5.15 GF3 ~ ~ GF3
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
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Figure 5.16 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault Fg indicated. In 
Figure 5.17 there are ambiguous deadlock states, thus input fault Fg is not diagnosable. 
Removing transitions on Y/R, excepting the one to Fg makes the system Fault Fg
diagnosable. 
C/D 
C/D 
S~ N , S~ 
A/L 
or 
D 
or 
R 
Y/R 
or 
Y/L 
or 
Y/D 
Figure 5.16 NDFSM GF8
S2 N,S2 N 
`~N,S Z N 
S2 N,S1 N 
Y/R 
D F8 , D F8
A/\ 
C/D _ \ Y/R p 
~C ~ ,,,`_•- ~ ~~  ~ ~ ~ 
A/L or C/D 
S3 N,S2 N  /R  .r:s 
C/D 
S2 N,S3 N ./~' 
  C/D 
CS1 N,S3 N /F 
  C/D 
~S3 N,S~ N Y/Ror ~ 
A/L 
S3N,S3N /i 
Y/R 
Figure 5.17 GF$ ~~ GF$
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
Y/R CS3 N, D F8
8' S 3 N 
C/D 
or 
C/L 
or 
C/R 
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Figure 5.18 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F9 indicated. 
In Figure 5.19 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying input fault F9 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on A/L, excepting the one to fault F9 makes the 
system fault F9 diagnosable. 
C/D 
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
Figure 5.18 NDFSM GF9
Figure 5.19 GF9 ~ ~ GF9 
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Figure 5.20 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F13 indicated. 
In Figure 5.21 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying input fault F13 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on Y/R, excepting the one to fault F13 makes the 
system fault F13 diagnosable. 
C/D 
D ,N 
A/L or C/D 
C/D 
l Y/R 
~ \ 
~ D , F13 J
Figure 5.20 NDFSM GF13 
~~ Figure 5.21 GF13 GF13 
C/D 
or C/L 
or C/R 
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Figure 5.22 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F14 indicated. 
In Figure 5.23 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying input fault Fz4 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on C/D, excepting the one to fault F14 makes the 
system fault F14 diagnosable. 
C/D 
C/D 
S1 N , S1
A/L 
or 
D 
or 
R 
Y/R 
or 
Y/L 
or 
Y/D ~ 
Figure 5.22 NDFSM GF'14 
Y/R orA/L\ 
C/D 
~~ 
~, 
C/D 
~ C/D r 
S2 N,S1 N =~ 
  C/D orq/L 
/D 
., .. ~ . 
/R 
3 N ' S2 N
S2 N,S3 N 
S1 N,S3 N 
Y/R 
~' ~! 
C/D / 
i 3 N,S1 N 
S N,S N 3 3 ~ 
C/D 
D F14 ,D F14 
A/L 
Figure 5.23 ~F '14 II GF'14 
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or C/L 
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or 
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or 
C/R 
l ° 14,S2N 
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Figure 5.24 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault Fl indicated. In 
Figure 5.25 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying transition fault Fz is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on Y/R, excepting the one to fault F1 makes the 
system fault Fl diagnosable. 
C/D 
Figure 5.24 NDFSM GFl
A/L 
Figure 5.25 GFl ~~ GFl 
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Figure 5.26 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F 2 indicated. In 
Figure 5.27 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying transition fault F 2 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on Y/R, excepting the one to F2 makes the system 
fault F2 diagnosable. 
C/D 
C/D 
Y/D or Y/l or Y/R 
C/D 
~_  + 
S2,N 
Figure 5.26 NDFSM GF2
Figure 5.27 GF2 ~ ~ GFZ
A/L or Y/R 
C/D C/D 
C/D 
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Figure 5.28 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F6 indicated. In 
Figure 5.29 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying transition fault F6 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on C/D, excepting the one to fault F6 makes the 
system fault F6 diagnosable. 
A/L or p►/D or A/R 
Figure 5.28 NDFSM GF6
Y/R 
Figure 5.29 GF6 ~ ~ GF6 
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Figure 5.30 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F7 indicated. In 
Figure 5.31 there are ambiguous deadlock states, implying transition fault F7 is not 
diagnosable. Removing transitions on C/D, excepting the one to fault F7 makes the 
system fault F7 diagnosable. 
A/L or A/D or A/R 
Figure 5.30 NDFSM GF7
Figure 5.31 GF, ~ ~ GF, 
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Figure 5.32 shoals the model of the state behavior with only fault F11 indicated. In 
Figure 5.33there are ambiguous deadlock states, thus transition fault Fll is not diagnos-
able. Removing transitions on A/L, excepting the one to F11 makes the system Fault 
Fll diagnosable. 
C/D 
Figure 5.32 NDFSM GF11
C/D 
Y/R CS2 N , S~ N A/L 
A/L or C/D 
• ( I 
Figure 5.33 GF11 GF11 
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Figure 5.34 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F12 indicated. In 
Figure 5.35there are ambiguous deadlock states, thus transition fault F12 is not diagnos-
able. Removing transitions on A/L, excepting the one to F12 makes the system Fault 
F12 diagnosable. 
C/D 
A/L 
A/L 
A/~ or A/D or A/R Y/R 
C/D 
A/L 
Figure 5.34 NDFSM GF12
C/D 
Y/R CS2 N , S1 N A/L 
A/l. or C/D 
Figure 5.35 GF12 ~ ( GF12 
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Figure 5.36 shoals the model of the state behavior with only fault F5 indicated. In 
Figure 5.37 there are no ambiguous deadlock states, and no ambiguous states in a cycle. 
Thus the system is fault F5 diagnosable. 
C/D 
Y/R 
Y/R 
Y/D or Y/L 
~ S2 ~ F5 \ Y/R 
C/D 
S3 ~ F5 
A/L 
 ~ C/D 
or 
S2 , N C/L 
or 
C/D 
Y/R 
/' \ 
S3 , N 
Figure 5.36 NDFSM GF5
Y/R 
S3 N,DN 
S2 N, D N 
S~ N,DN 
D N, S~ N 
D N, S3 N  C/D 
C/ ~ ~~~~ D N, S N ~ C/D or C/L or C/R 2 
A/` S, N,S,N 
Figure 5.37 GF5 ~ ~ GF5 
A/R 
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Figure 5.38 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F10 indicated. In 
Figure 5.39 there are no ambiguous deadlock states, and no ambiguous states in a cycle. 
Thus the system is fault Flo diagnosable. 
Figure 5.38 NDFSM GF10
Figure 5.39 GFIo (( GFIo 
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Figure 5.40 shows the model of the state behavior with only fault F~5 indicated. In 
Figure 5.41 there are no ambiguous deadlock states, and no ambiguous states in a cycle. 
Thus the system is fault F15 diagnosable. 
Figure 5.40 NDFSM GF15 
C/D 
Figure 5.41 G F15 ~~ GF'~5 
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The Diagnoser 
A diagnoser is a discrete event system which passively observes the input-output 
sequence executed by the system and determines the possible faults that may have 
occurred. Each state in the diagnoser carries a label indicating whether or not a fault 
might have occurred. it turns that we can use our model of overall behavior given 
as G itself as a diagnoser. The finite state machine G is an "off-line" diagnoser as it 
models all the behaviors, and identifies fault for all possible behaviors. One does not 
need to construct the entire G for performing diagnosis online. Only the part reachable 
by observed input-output sequence should be constructed. To reduce the complexity of 
constructing the diagnoser, an online diagnoser is built depending upon the particular 
input-output pair observed. 
A diagnoser can be of two types: local diagnoser, and global diagnoser. A local 
diagnoser is a diagnoser which observes the input-output sequence of one node only. An 
example is as shown in Figure 5.42, where the local observation occur at one node only 
(marked by the triangle) . 
c 
12 
Local diagnoser 
• 
Figure 5.42 Architecture of a local diagnoser 
A global diagnoser observes the input-output sequence of more than one node. It 
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is built by synchronizing the input-output sequence (explained below) observed at each 
of the nodes it can observe. An example of a global diagnoser is shown in Figure 5.43, 
where it observes the behavior at both nodes 1 and 2. 
Figure 5.43 Architecture of a global diagnoser 
The local diagnoser can be built using the algorithm 1, but, restricted to the input-
output sequence observed. The algorithm is as follows: 
Algorithm 5 1. We assume the initial state to be Sl with no fault, so Sl is aug-
mented by the label N. 
2. Next we iteratively compute the states reachable on the observed input-output 
sequence for automaton G. On observation of input-output pair i~/o~ at state x~ 
with label l~, the reachable states are computed using the transition function of 
G. 
A global diagnoser can be built by performing an input-output synchronization of 
the local observers of the nodes being observed. The algorithm is as given below: 
Algorithm 6 1. Assuming initial state is Sl for all the nodes with no fault. So, they 
are augmented by the label N. 
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2. Compute the reachable states on an input-output observation by synchronizing 
the local observers of the nodes being observed on the observer input-output pair 
say, the transitions for each local observer is 
(xl , ll) ~Z1 ~°1 ~ (xl , ll) for local observer 1. --~ 
(x2, l2) 
X22 ~°2 ~ (x2 , l2) for local observer 2 . 
Whenever input of one is output of other, the synchronized transition in the global 
observer yields: 
((x 1 ~ 11) , (x2 ~ l2)) 
X21 
~°1~ ~ 
X22 ~°2) ((x 1 ~ ll) ~ (x2 ~ l2)) where 22 = Ol . 
Example 4 Consider the X.25 protocol example with local observation at sender end 
as shown in Figure 5.42. When the observation Y/R, C/D, A/L, C/D occurs, the 
reachable part of automaton G (of Figure 5.42) is given in Figure 5.44. As can be seen 
from Figure 5.44 at this point either an input fault F7 has occurred or transition fault 
Fs has occurred. 
Y/R C/D A/L 
Figure 5.44 A local diagnoser 
For the global observer we use the following notation: 
C/D 
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xi : represents a state i in machine j 
Fi : represents a fault i in machine j 
~z~~0'k ~ Zk ~o~k ~: the lath input-output pair at nodes j and ji. 
Example 5 Consider the X.25 protocol example with local observation at sender end 
as shown in Figure 5.43. When the observation Y/R, C/D, A/L, C/D occurs at node 
1, and -/Y, R/C, D/A, L/C occurs at node 2 ,the reachable part of automaton G (of 
Figure 5.43) is given in Figure 5.45. As can be seen from Figure 5.45 at this point either 
an output fault F7 has occurred. 
(Y/R) (-/Y) (C/D)(R/C) (C/D)(UC) 
~ 1 ~ 
(S ~ 1 ,N) (S 32 ,N)  .~ ~ 
1,Fg1 
)~ S 12 ~F~~ 
~ / ~ ~ 
Figure 5.45 A global diagnoser 
Executing the algorithm as shown in the example we can detect a fault, and also 
identify it. This kind of diagnoser really helps for fault detection, and identification 
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required for fault management. we next conclude our work, and discuss some future 
work. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In our work we have shown how discrete event system can be used to do passive 
testing in networks, to detect a fault as early as possible, then to diagnose the fault. 
The diagnoser we construct determines the possible faults that may have occurred by 
observing the input-output sequence. The network specification was assumed to be a 
communicating finite state machine and the faults considered were output fault, input 
fault, and transition fault. 
By using the algorithm for delectability we know which traces are detectable, and 
which are not, and then remove the undetectable ones, and thus come up with a de-
tectable sub-system. This method and also sensor refinement method observed in [31] 
can be used to design detectable/diagnosable systems. From our analysis, we find that 
all the faults are detectable but not diagnosable. Output faults are diagnosable but, 
input, and transitions faults are not diagnosable. 
In our algorithm to build the diagnoser we don't need to perform any backward 
analysis that is done in Miller's paper [7] to detect, and identify a fault. we introduce 
a method to obtain a global diagnoser, which gives better results than a local diagnoser 
at one node, regarding fault detection. 
Developing methods for designing diagnosable systems is a challenge. For systems 
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that have certain faults that are not diagnosable, passive testing should be combined 
with active testing to perform diagnosis. Another challenge is to incorporate timed 
behavior to see whether it helps in management of network fault. The final challenge 
is to integrate the technique that has been developed for passive testing using discrete 
event systems with the existing techniques for the fault management . Ours is a more 
formal approach for network fault management that is different from the methods used 
today. 
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